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Abstract 
Standardization organizations in the area of information and telecommunica-
tions technology have mushroomed in the last two decades. In addition to new 
official organizations at the regional level, many private consortiums and forums 
have been set up that complement and compete with the incumbent national and 
international organizations. The organizational landscape and the relations be-
tween the standardization organizations are examined, and institutional reasons 
that could explain why the frequency and intensity of jurisdictional conflicts has 
remained low are considered. Institutional features do not only frame a stan-
dardization organizations behavior toward other organizations, they also ac-
count for speed, exclusiveness, costs and market acceptance of standardization 
and thus influence firms decisions as to which organization to turn to with a 
standards issue. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
In den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten ist die Zahl der Standardisierungsorganisa-
tionen im Bereich der Informations- und Telekommunikationstechnik rasch ge-
wachsen. Neben neuen offiziellen Organisationen auf der regionalen Ebene sind 
viele private Konsortien und Foren entstanden, die sich mit den bestehenden na-
tionalen und internationalen Organisationen ergänzen oder auch mit ihnen kon-
kurrieren. Die Landschaft der Standardisierungsorganisationen und die Beziehun-
gen zwischen ihnen werden untersucht und zudem die institutionellen Faktoren 
aufgezeigt, die dazu beitragen, dass Kompetenzkonflikte relativ selten auftreten 
und nicht sehr intensiv sind. Die institutionellen Merkmale kanalisieren nicht 
nur das Verhalten der Standardisierungsorganisationen untereinander, sie beein-
flussen auch Geschwindigkeit, Exklusivität, Kosten und Marktakzeptanz der 
Standardisierung und leiten damit die Entscheidung der Unternehmen, an wel-
che Organisation sie sich mit einem Standardisierungsproblem wenden. 
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1 Introduction 
In the last two decades we have observed a proliferation of standardization or-
ganizations. In telecommunications and information technology in particular  
the focus of this paper  changes have been far-reaching. Both the globalization of 
markets and the blurring of technical boundaries have induced an overlap of the 
domains of international and regional standardization organizations. At the same 
time, standards organizations at the national level are losing significance. Tradi-
tional organizations have been restructured, and  assisted by governments  
new official standards organizations have been created at the regional level. Most 
dramatic, however, has been the growth of private consortiums and forums 
which were set up by business groups to whom it appeared more promising to 
establish their own forum than to take their interests in creating technical stan-
dards to the incumbent organizations (cf. Drake 1994). Thus, official standard 
setting is confronted with an informal sector of standards development, the 
evolution of which indicates some discontent with the traditional organizations 
and entails an inherent potential of jurisdictional conflict. 
In the first part of this paper I examine how the structure of the global landscape 
of standardization organizations developed, how the organizations deal with one 
another, and whether competition or collaboration prevails. I argue that the level 
of jurisdictional conflict between the organizations has remained comparatively 
low  not simply because scarce resources demand avoiding duplication of work, 
but also due to institutional similarities of old and new standardization organiza-
tions. 
Telecommunications and information technology are network industries where 
standards  or more specifically compatibility standards  play a crucial role 
(Shapiro/Varian 1999). Both industries together with the electronic media sector 
form the core of the information society, which is characterized by an increasing 
need for standards (Williams 1997). In fact producers as well as users can benefit 
from standards, although they are usually developed by producers because they 
have the greatest potential economic benefit from setting standards. With the 
convergence in technologies between telecommunications, information technol-
ogy and broadcasting, there is likely to be common interests in standards be-
tween different organizations. The multitude of standards organizations offers 
                                                   
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference The Political Economy 
of Standards Setting organized by Yves Mény and Walter Mattli at the Robert Schuman 
Centre of the European University Institute, Florence, June 4 and 5, 1998. For valuable 
comments I am indebted to Walter Mattli, Helen Milner, Stephen Woolcock, Evangelos 
Vardakas and Frank Borowicz. I also thank Ulrich Müller for research assistance. 
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firms a choice as to which organization they can turn to if they want to initiate 
standardization. This raises the question of which factors the decision is guided 
by. Some of these factors rooted in the institutional shape of standards organiza-
tions are illustrated in the second part of the paper. 
In a short section preceding the two main parts of this paper, the role and the di-
mensions of compatibility and its relation to the process of standardization are 
clarified in order to illustrate the ambivalence of this process between collabora-
tion and competition. 
2 A theoretical view of standardization 
This paper is concerned with organizations that develop compatibility standards. 
These standards define protocol, code, and interface specifications and aim at in-
teroperability of complementary technical components. Compatibility allows dif-
ferent products and services to work together in networks. Compatibility stan-
dards are coordinative standards: they facilitate coordinated manufacturing of 
network goods and thus help reduce transaction costs.1 This is why in many 
cases producers of network goods who acknowledge technological interdepend-
ence are interested in coordinating with others, and it is at the same time one rai-
son dêtre of standardization organizations, which provide an arena to collectively 
develop and negotiate on standards. Getting involved in standardization requires 
membership in a standards committee. Such a committee may be a unit of a 
classical standardization organization or an industry consortium or forum out-
side the official organizations. However, only a fraction of all coordinative stan-
dards result from committee work. Some emerge in markets where bandwagon 
and imitation processes can be observed. Others are imposed by dominant firms, 
leaving smaller competitors and users of a technology no choice. The latter indi-
cates that standardization is not always a low-conflict business. 
The tension between collaboration and competition inherent in standardization is 
revealed by a closer look at what might be called the two faces of compatibility. 
Compatibility has a vertical and a horizontal dimension. Technical components 
based on the same standard are either compatible complements or compatible 
                                                   
1  We have suggested drawing an analytical distinction between regulative and coordi-
native standards. While regulative standards for, say, environmental protection are 
defined and mandated by hierarchical political governance, coordinative standards, 
say for a specific modulation procedure, may emerge in markets or be adopted by 
committees on a voluntary basis (Schmidt/Werle 1998: 119120). 
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substitutes (David/Bunn 1988: 171). If the components Y1 and Z in Figure 1 are 
designed according to standard A, they are vertically compatible and comple-
mentary because they can be used with each other. A specific format of a film 
(e.g. 35 mm) is compatible with specific cameras, or a certain word processing 
program runs on a certain PC operating system. Often a single component is use-
less unless it is interoperable with a compatible complement. Producers as well as 
users of these components have a vital interest in compatibility. However, if not 
only Y1 but also another functionally equivalent component Y2 is compatible with 
Z, then from the users and the producers point of view it makes no difference 
whether Y2 or Y1 is employed. Thus, with respect to interoperability with Z, both 
components are horizontally compatible substitutes if they are designed accord-
ing to the same standard. WordPerfect, Word and other word processors, for in-
stance, are horizontally compatible because they all run on Windows. 
Economists often have only the aspect of horizontal (substitutive) compatibility in 
mind when they talk about the effects of compatibility (Katz/Shapiro 1985: 425). 
Horizontal compatibility is indeed a precondition for competition (cf. Tirole 1988: 
298301). Producers of substitutive technology compete; those of complementary 
components do not. 
These complementary components can be combined into composite goods or sys-
tems. It is complementarity rather than substitutivity that creates the network 
Figure 1 Two faces of compatibility 
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characteristics of goods (cf. Economides 1989; Economides/Salop 1992). If goods 
or services are complementary, their production or consumption can have posi-
tive network externalities, implying that individual actions affect the utility of 
other actors (Gilbert 1992).2 This can result in a critical mass dilemma. Unless, 
as vertically integrated manufacturers, they are able to provide complete systems, 
producers (of components) of a network technology tend to wait and see what 
others decide to provide because they do not want to become stranded with in-
compatible products (Rogers 1995; also Granovetter 1978). Stranding can be 
avoided by establishing a consensus on the interface characteristics of the com-
ponents. Convergence on one single compatibility standard would be the most ef-
ficient solution (cf. Church/Gandal 1992). 
The common interest of producers of complementary products in compatibility 
does not guarantee that it will be achieved. Only if the producers of components 
Y and Z have no diverging preferences as to which technical specification they 
choose, will they easily agree on one single compatibility standard. In this case, 
which describes a pure coordination problem, standardization requires no more 
than communication to avoid isolated action resulting in accidentally diverging 
choices. Standardization organizations open to all interested parties provide such 
an opportunity to communicate. As soon as the producers of component Y begin 
to prefer standard A, while the producers of Z are tending toward solution B, it 
may be difficult to achieve compatibility although both sides do not dissent on 
the high value of a common standard. In terms of game theory, this situation en-
tails a battle of the sexes type of conflict. Coordination on a common solution 
promises the highest total payoff, but reaching this solution requires one of the 
parties to settle on its second preference only. This party will also gain from a 
standard, but the payoff will be relatively smaller than that of the other party. 
Battle of the sexes has been identified to be the typical conflict in compatibility 
standardization (Farrell/Saloner 1988; Schmidt/Werle 1998: 98108). Arthur 
Stein (1982: 309) speaks of a dilemma of common aversions. The parties have a 
strong common aversion to incompatibility, but they lack a common recipe for 
preventing it if they prefer different standards, which imply different relative 
gains. 
Whenever the relative gains at stake are high, the battle of the sexes can escalate 
and the game can be transformed from a positive sum to a zero sum game or to a 
prisoners dilemma (Snidal 1985). Often the actors involved change their inter-
action orientations and pursue more conflictive standardization strategies (cf. 
Scharpf 1997). But game theory need not be overstressed. If we return to the two 
faces of compatibility (Figure 1), it is easy to imagine the producers of the func-
                                                   
2  Network technologies contrast with the conventional assumption in economic theory 
of diminishing returns to scale. They are subject to increasing returns (Arthur 1989). 
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tionally equivalent components Y1 and Y2 regarding each other as competitors. 
From their angles, the standard to be adopted will lay the groundwork for com-
petitive advantage and disadvantage. Thus, for each producer of the Y compo-
nents compromising with the producer of Z is more likely than reaching an 
agreement with their competitor. 
It is against this background of the specific tensions resulting from the two faces 
of compatibility that standardization organizations and standardization strategies 
shall be analyzed. The analysis includes a feature that is neglected in the game-
theoretical view on standardization. In many cases the technical solution to a 
compatibility problem and/or the economic implications of different alternatives 
are uncertain. In consequence, firms preferences stay indeterminate and ambiva-
lent during parts of the standardization process. Therefore the efficiency aspect 
of standardization, i.e. finding an adequate solution to a compatibility problem, 
often overshadows its distributional aspect (cf. Schelling 1960: 21). First, value 
must be created through joint action before it can be claimed individually. 
3 The landscape of standardization organizations: Competition, 
coordination, co-existence 
The examination of the concept of compatibility and its two faces suggests that 
producers of complementary goods are better off with compatibility than with-
out. Unless they are able to secure compatibility by vertically integrating or con-
trolling the production of all components of a system, they can achieve it through 
voluntary standards. The best solution ceteris paribus would be striving for one 
single standard, which implies concentrating standards development for a spe-
cific system and the respective market in one standardization organization. As a 
matter of fact, standard developing organizations hesitate to define more than 
one standard or a standard with too many options for a specific technical func-
tion. The principle of parsimony of standards options has developed into an insti-
tutionalized value of these organizations. All this leads to the conclusion that the 
standardization business comes close to a natural monopoly, which means that 
the co-existence of more than one standard-developing organization is inefficient 
(see Genschel 1997). This suggestion, however, contrasts sharply with what has 
been observed in standardization of telecommunications and information tech-
nology, two network industries in which compatibility standards play a crucial 
role. The number of organizations developing standards has grown significantly 
in the last two decades, and there can be no doubt that their jurisdictions overlap, 
which entails conflict potential. 
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It is impossible to give a comprehensive overview of all standardization organiza-
tions in telecommunications and information technology, and in this sense Figure 
2 is inevitably incomplete. Figure 2 refers to the organizational landscape of stan-
dardization in the middle of the 1990s, drawing on a more comprehensive dia-
gram provided by Rutkowski.3 Only a few features of Figure 2  with the focus 
on the formal status of the organizations  shall be discussed. 
Generally, three dimensions according to which standardization organizations 
can be grouped appear to be relevant: 
 The level (scope) of standardization: We find organizations with national, re-
gional or global significance. 
 The sector or industry affiliation: Although the boundaries are blurring, we 
can still distinguish organizations with a focus on information technology 
from those focusing on telecommunications. 
 The formal status of the organizations: We have official standards organiza-
tions  recognized and often supported by governments. And we have pri-
vate groups and committees (forums, consortiums) based on informal agree-
ments or multilateral contracts. 
In addition, three distinctive roots combined in different proportions characterize 
each standards organization (Schmidt/Werle 1998: 56): 
 A political root indicates governments control interests. They include safety 
aspects, technology and industrial policy objectives, and national welfare 
goals. 
 A commercial root that expresses business and profit interests including the 
reduction of transaction costs and positive coordination externalities. 
 A professional root that indicates a collective interest of the engineering pro-
fession to enhance, consolidate and codify technical knowledge and safeguard 
professional control of the development of technical systems. 
These roots are not included in Figure 2, but they will be identified when the ori-
gins of official and private standardization organizations are examined. 
                                                   
3  Rutkowski published it in 1994. It was found on the server of the Internet Society: 
http:/ /www.isoc.org/images/univers.gif. 
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Figure 2 The organizational landscape of standardization in the middle of the 1990s 
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AAFNOR Association Française de Normalisation 
ANSI American National Standards Institute 
ATSC Australian Telecommunication Standards Committee 
BSI British Standards Institution 
CEN European Committee for Standardization 
CEN/ CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization 
CEPT Conference of European Posts and Telecommunications Administrations 
COS Corporation for Open Systems 
DIN Deutsches Institut für Normung 
ECMA European Computer Manufacturers Association 
ECSA-T1 Exchange Carriers Standards Association, USA 
EDIFACT Electronic Data Interchange For Administration, Commerce and Transport 
EIA Electronics Industry Association 
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
EWOS European Workshop for Open Systems 
GSCG Global Standards Collaboration Group 
IAB Internet Advertising Bureau 
IEC International Electrotechnical Committee 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
JSA Japanese Standards Association 
JTC 1 Joint Technical Committee 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
POSI Group Promoting Conference for Open Systems Interconnection 
RARE Résaux Associés pour la Recherche Européenne 
RIPE Réseaux IP Européens 
SPAG  Standards Promotion and Application Group 
TIA Telecommunication Industry Association 
TTA Telecommunications Technology Association, Korea 
TTC(UP) Telecommunications Technology Committee, Japan 
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Official organizations 
The two official organizations with the broadest range of responsibilities for 
standardization at the international level are ITU-T, the standardization branch of 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the Joint Technical Com-
mittee 1 (JTC1), which was set up in 1987 by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). 
Although ITU, on the one hand, and ISO and IEC, on the other hand, have a dif-
ferent legal status, they can be regarded as classical international organizations 
with national membership and one-nation-one-vote decision rules. ITU-T issues 
telecommunications standards (called recommendations), whereas JTC1 covers 
information technology. Their standards are international, which means in the 
area of telecommunications that they are used to coordinating international net-
works and services. At the national or regional level, other standards or sub-
standards with a specific profile matched to the particular area and market may 
apply. They are issued by organizations with respective responsibility. A similar 
differentiation, though not that clear-cut, was also aimed at in information tech-
nology. The traditional horizontal and vertical separation of jurisdictions helped 
avoid conflicts between standards organizations and prevent more than one 
standard from being issued where a technical specification was needed. 
The creation of JTC1 has to be seen against the background of overlapping organ-
izational domains. Since the early 1970s ISO and IEC had difficulties in clearly 
separating their jurisdictions in the area of equipment and components of infor-
mation technology. An agreement in 1976 concerning the division of labor in this 
area indicated that both organizations gave agreements and coordination prefer-
ence to competition from an early stage. As a consequence, in 1987, both organi-
zations institutionalized collaboration by setting up JTC1 and transferring tasks 
and competencies from ISO and IEC committees to this unit (Schmidt/Werle 
1998: 4650; David/Shurmer 1996: 792). 
Another example of cooperation instead of competition relates to the famous 
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) frame of reference adopted by both ITU and 
ISO in the early 1980s. OSI was meant to provide a framework for developing 
open, i.e. non-proprietary, standards for computer networks at a time when ven-
dor-specific proprietary networks prevailed. ITU and ISO claimed competence in 
this area because public networks (ITU) and computers (ISO) were the constitu-
ent components of computer networks. Drawing undisputed distinctions be-
tween the jurisdictions proved to be difficult. The case of e-mail standardization 
provides an example (Schmidt/Werle 1998: 229262). In the early 1980s, experts 
in both organizations worked at the same time on what was called message han-
dling standards. After a short period of mutual ignorance both sides started to 
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coordinate work. They organized co-located meetings of the standards commit-
tees and, later, most of the work was consolidated under the roof of ITU, al-
though no official agreement was striven for. As a result, both organizations pub-
lished many identical standards in message handling and, in doing so, avoided 
duplication of work. Even more important was the fact that adopting competing 
standards was avoided, because this would not be compatible with a basic ra-
tionale of standardization organizations aimed at converging different technical 
solutions into one single standard. However, in this case collaboration was initi-
ated by members of the standards committees, not by the top-level executives of 
ITU and OSI. Some of the members also participated in pre-standardization work 
on message handling in the International Federation for Information Processing 
(IFIP), where they had an opportunity to exchange information concerning the 
work of ITU and ISO. As both organizations shared the goal of developing an 
open non-proprietary standard, one might expect them to have found a way to 
get along with each other. The ISO and the ITU committee had invested time and 
energy in developing standards, but they preferred different draft solutions, 
though both were far from a final solution. Thus, the friction between the com-
mittees was akin to a battle of the sexes where the relative gains were not very 
high yet. Overlapping membership in ISO, ITU and IFIP, the emerging personal 
networks and the common interest in a standard fostered collaboration. 
Many other instances indicate that ITU and ISO/JTC1 have avoided conflict and 
competition not only through informal cooperation but increasingly on a formal-
ized basis. The intensity of cooperation is indicated in Figure 2 by the black line 
connecting ITU and JTC1. Especially in the areas of standardization relating to 
the OSI standards architecture, cooperation became a matter of routine (Genschel 
1995: 162168). Even when diverging standards were adopted, they did not nec-
essarily lead to incompatibility of systems as long as they were integrated in the 
overall OSI frame of reference. Seen from this angle, OSI  although a failure in 
many respects  can be regarded as an early example of what has been called the 
meta-standards approach by David/Shurmer (1996: 810). Meta-standards stip-
ulate technical performance features rather than definite specifications, thereby 
leaving room for different standard options approved by different organizations. 
This helps avoid conflict. A recent, more visible move to coordinate standardiza-
tion activities at the global level was the creation of a Joint Committee on Global 
Information Infrastructure Standards by ISO, IEC and ITU in 1995. Cross-repre-
sentation and sharing information are also features of the pattern of coordination 
between these organizations. 
A new potential source of conflict for ITU in the 1980s  apart from the conver-
gence tendencies of telecommunications and information technology  was the 
emergence of telecommunications standardization organizations at the regional 
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level, which reflected the growing significance of regional markets in this liberal-
izing area at the end of this decade. A certain degree of regional diversity of stan-
dards in telecommunications appeared to be inevitable, and it expressed the 
competitive concerns of regional companies. The European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI), the US Exchange Carriers Standards Association 
(ECSA T1)4 and the Japanese Telecommunications Technology Committee (TTC) 
were established. ECSA T1 and TTC are virtually national organizations (i.e. rep-
resenting the USA and Japan) that have regional significance. Foreign members 
are admitted. Their membership structure is company-based. Each company has 
one vote. ETSI has a mixed system with some decisions taken by company-based 
and others taken by nation-based weighted voting. The appearance of the re-
gional organizations threatened to undermine ITUs authority (cf. Hawkins 1992). 
However, early on, the three regional organizations and ITU opted for coordina-
tion and division of labor instead of competition. A first step towards work-
sharing was finalized at a conference at Fredericksburg, Virginia, in 1990 (Gen-
schel/Werle 1993). The common goal to prevent organizational competition, be-
cause it might violate the institutional rule to avoid conflicting standards, was in-
voked to facilitate the agreement. 
In 1991, also ISO and IEC and their respective European counterparts CEN and 
CENELEC reached a consensus on cooperation between the two levels of stan-
dardization with the so-called Vienna Agreement and the Lugano Agree-
ment. The latter was followed by the Dresden Agreement in 1996, which addi-
tionally specifies the way in which new work is taken up by IEC or CENELEC 
(Falke 1999). Horizontal coordination of the three official European standardiza-
tion organizations ETSI, CEN and CENELEC is provided by an Information and 
Communication Technology Standards Board (ICTSB) with representatives from 
these three organizations. 
If we look at the national level of standardization, we find that official organiza-
tions operate in most of the industrialized countries. While they are politically in-
dependent, they are more or less closely linked to governments. The national or-
ganizations (one per nation) which are most representative of standardization in 
their respective countries are members of ISO or IEC. In contrast with most other 
industries, telecommunications has no tradition of formally independent stan-
dardization in many countries. After consulting with manufacturers of telecom-
munications equipment and service providers, the national PTT monopolies used 
to set the standards in their own right. In the wake of liberalization the PTTs lost 
their predominance, but this did not lead to the creation of national standardiza-
                                                   
4  The name has since been changed to The Alliance for Telecommunications Industry 
Solutions (ATIS). Before ECSA T1 developed into a regionally significant organiza-
tion, it was called Standards Committee for Telecommunications (ANSI T1). 
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tion bodies in Europe. The manufacturers of telecommunications equipment pre-
ferred regional or international standards. Therefore European firms supported 
the plan of the European Commission to establish ETSI (Werle/Fuchs 1993).5 In 
general, purely national standardization work has significantly decreased in 
Europe, as it has in other parts of the world (cf. Rixius 1997). National organiza-
tions, however, play an important role in transposing regional into national stan-
dards (cf. de Vries 1999). This requires coordination between these two levels, 
which in Europe is provided, for instance, by the so-called Vilamoura Proce-
dure,6 which was adopted in 1988 to govern the relationship between 
CENELEC and the respective national organizations in Europe (David/Shurmer 
1996: 808). 
Although they represent only a minority of all organizations involved in standard 
setting, the official organizations of standardization have most visibly shaped the 
landscapes institutional structure.7 Many of these organizations have political 
roots (cf. Olshan 1993). Figure 3 shows the prevailing institutional features of this 
organizational field which have been explored in several studies using different 
research methods.8 Not all of these features shall be discussed in detail. Com-
patibility standards adopted by committees in official and less official standardi-
zation organizations are voluntary and not mandatory. Their implementation 
cannot be imposed and their diffusion in the market is not guaranteed. Thus, in 
constellations with a leveled playing field (symmetric power relations), the stan-
dards that are most likely to diffuse are the ones that have been adopted on the 
basis of consensus by committees open to all interested players. Formally the de-
cision rules of the official standards organizations allow for some kind of quali-
fied majority voting. De facto, however, their work is also consensus-based be-
cause at the working level, i.e. in the technical committees and study groups or 
their subgroups where the developmental activities take place and each partici-
pating organization has one vote, no decision is taken against explicit and serious 
opposition of any single participant. 
                                                   
5 ETSI has concluded more agreements with other standardization bodies than any 
other organization. Apart from avoiding duplication of standardization activities in 
overlapping areas, the agreements are also intended to facilitate discussion of com-
mon problems or collaborative research. (For an overview, see: http://www.etsi.fr/
cpm/agreement/list.htm). 
6  For the USA, see OTA (1992). 
7  The institutional features of the standardization organizations, among other factors, 
guide the companies decisions as to which organization they turn to if they want to 
have their preferred standard adopted. Therefore some of the features will be dis-
cussed in more detail in the next section. 
8  Schmidt/Werle (1998: 5659); David/Shurmer (1996: 793795); Egyedi (1996: 111
120); OTA (1992); David/Greenstein (1990); Cargill (1988); Robinson (1986); Cerni 
(1984); Jones (1979); Verman (1973: 150188). 
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Inclusiveness of committees and the rule of consensual decisions  two rather 
undisputed institutional features of the organizational field  facilitate the diffu-
sion of a non-mandated voluntary standard. On the other hand, negotiation proc-
esses in these constellations can be time-consuming, and they easily lead to dead-
lock or to unattractive compromise solutions which at the end nobody wants to 
implement (cf. Buchanan/Tullock 1971; also Scharpf 1997). 
More exclusive standardization organizations with fewer players promise to be 
more efficient and also more effective given that their membership is restricted to 
technology leaders and firms with substantial market power. Setting up new 
standards organizations, instead of taking a standardization issue to the incum-
bent ones, is often motivated by the potential benefits of exclusiveness. However, 
other objectives have also guided the establishment of new organizations, as we 
can see when we look at some of these forums and consortiums in more detail. 
All these organizations differ in one way or another from the incumbent official 
ones, though they share with them more institutional features than one might ex-
pect. Some observers fail to notice this phenomenon of institutional similarity or 
institutional isomorphism of the organizational field of standardization, as it is 
termed in sociological new institutionalism (DiMaggio/Powell 1991). Institu-
tional similarity, on the other hand, does not rule out jurisdictional conflicts and 
struggles for predominance or even hegemony in standardization. 
Figure 3 Prevailing institutional features of standardization organizations 
1. Participation is open to those who are substantially interested, but it is subject to certain 
membership requirements. 
2. Members are organizations rather than individuals. Individuals are regarded as  
delegates of organizations. 
3. The work is committee-based, cooperative and consensus-oriented. It follows formalized 
rules and procedures. 
4. Organization and working procedures are impartial, unsponsored and politically  
independent (due process). The organizations are non-profit organizations. 
5. The work is based on technological knowledge and follows the principle of parsimony of 
standard options. It is not remunerated, and it is conceived of as being superior to market se-
lection of standards. 
6. Standards are non-mandatory and public goods. However, they are not necessarily  
provided to the public free of charge (but on equal terms). 
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Older private organizations 
If we look again at Figure 2 we can see that the majority of standardization or-
ganizations do not have an official status. Most of them are private consortiums 
and forums. A few formally unofficial standardization organizations are posi-
tioned in the upper half of Figure 2 close to the official ones. This indicates that 
they are regarded as an integral part of the official standardization regime. A pro-
totype of this kind of standards organizations is the European Computer Manu-
facturers Association (ECMA).9 Being what we would call a private consortium 
today, ECMA was established in 1961, with the objective of becoming active in 
standardization. Early on its membership was restricted to computer manufac-
turers engaged in Europe, but associate members from other parts of the world 
were accepted when they had a general interest in the associations work. More-
over, all vendors who owned manufacturing facilities in Europe could join 
ECMA. Thus, it was no problem, for instance, for American multinationals such 
as IBM, Xerox, Honeywell and DEC to be accepted as regular members. ECMA 
has a number of technical committees and task groups in which all members  
regardless of their national basis  have full voting rights. ECMAs standards are 
usually meant to complement official international standards or to be fed as pro-
posals into ongoing standardization work of the official international organiza-
tions. The European thrust in ECMA, which is aimed at leveling the playing field 
in information technology, was moderated by opening the organization to global 
players with a base in Europe. Thus, ECMA quickly established itself as a recog-
nized standardization organization with stable links to ITU-T, JTC1 and ETSI. In a 
settlement between ECMA, ETSI and CENELEC in 1991, ECMA was recognized 
as a standardization organization in its own right and at the same time a feeder 
organization for the official regional and global standardization organizations. In 
contrast with these organizations, the principle of national representation in the 
standard setting process is irrelevant in ECMA. 
The initial interest in neutralizing existing differentials in market power between 
European and North American vendors underlying the creation of ECMA also 
became apparent in other efforts to set up standardization committees. Examples 
are provided by several facets of the so-called Open Systems Movement, which is 
linked to the efforts of ITU and ISO to promote OSI. In 1983, the European Stan-
dards Promotion and Application Group (SPAG) was set up by eight major 
manufacturers of information technology based in Europe. SPAG aimed at facili-
tating the implementation of the base standards issued by ISO/JTC1 and CCITT, 
a predecessor of ITU-T, through the specification of functional profiles. In 1987 
                                                   
9  ECMA is now called International Europe-Based Association for Standardizing In-
formation and Communication Systems. 
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SPAG initiated the formation of the European Workshop for Open Systems 
(EWOS), which was created by the most representative European federations of 
technology suppliers and user organizations and was meant to coordinate work 
and provide for collaboration (Macpherson 1990: 269). They included CEN/
CENELEC and also, as a member of the steering committee, DG IX (General Di-
rectorate) of the European Commission (Genschel 1995). Like many official stan-
dardization organizations, SPAG, ECMA, EWOS and some others have a political 
root. However, their creation does not reflect a general (national) political interest 
in controlling standardization; it was rather motivated by industrial policy goals. 
These goals corresponded with the business interest of European manufacturers. 
Thus, these organizations have also a commercial root. As they specify general 
standards rather than define new ones, their relationship to the official interna-
tional organizations is complementary rather than competitive.10 
Younger private organizations 
The idea of open standards, with a different connotation though, has also left its 
mark in the landscape of the younger private standards groups, consortiums and 
forums.11 Most of them were set up in the 1990s and only a fraction of them are 
included in Figure 2. Those we find in the lower part of Figure 2 are quite promi-
nent and have existed for some time. From a point of view of organizational 
change as a consequence of pressure towards institutional similarity, the case of 
the X/Open Group deserves to be mentioned. Similar to EWOS, but even more 
explicit in its strategic orientation, X/Open was an alliance of five European 
computer manufacturers forged (in 1984) to counterattack non-European vendors 
(Gabel 1987). However, after a few years,  similar to ECMA  all major interna-
tional computer vendors became members of X/Open. With its general objective 
being to level the playing field by supporting or creating non-proprietary, or at 
least non-discriminatory, open standards, X/Open was committed to industry-
                                                   
10  Arrangements of coordination expressing this complementarity in the standardiza-
tion of functional specifications (profiles) were established between EWOS and re-
spective North American and Asian workshops on the one hand and JTC1 on the 
other (Genschel/Werle 1993: 219). 
11  Initially only specifications within the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) frame of 
reference were regarded as open standards. Later, virtually all non-proprietary stan-
dards issued by official standardization organizations and some private units were 
accepted as open. In 1994, for instance, a US Panel on Federal Internetworking Re-
quirements, established by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), recommended accepting standards developed by the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (see below) as open international standards (Radack 1994; in more detail 
CSTB 1994: 70111). 
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wide cooperation and could not refuse applications for admission by the large 
non-European computer manufacturers. Thus, X/Open lost its exclusive charac-
ter and was opened for many new members. Other private forums and consor-
tiums such as the Corporation for Open Systems (COS), the X-Window Consor-
tium and the Open Software Foundation (OSF), all set up in the late 1980s, relied 
on even broader membership. OSF in addition received large contributions from 
a rather small circle of big influential members who created the organization (cf. 
Dunphy 1991).12 Like the official organizations, some of the private ones have 
been confronted with the problem of jurisdictional overlap. In order to avoid 
open competition, OSF and X/Open consolidated their activities by creating a 
new organization called The Open Group in February 1996. It coordinates and 
partially merges the operations of the two units. 
The tendency to set up new para-standardization bodies of regional and global 
significance, instead of dealing with new standardization problems in the tradi-
tional official organizations, has gained momentum in the 1990s  not only in the 
area of information technology but also in telecommunications (OECD 1991: 84
86).13 Many new consortiums and forums were created, while others extended 
their domains. The Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) Forum and the Frame 
Relay Forum are two examples. Others are related to the Integrated Services Digi-
tal Network (ISDN). Many of these forums cover areas in which committees of 
ITU-T have also been active. 
Internet standardization has developed quite differently, being completely de-
tached from any official standardization. Internet standards are developed by the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which is split into numerous working 
groups covering eight to ten functional areas. Working groups can be easily cre-
ated, and most of them are wound up after they have finished their task. The 
groups are managed by area directors. In contrast to most standardization or-
ganizations, participation in IETF and its working groups is open to anyone, and 
a broad and unrestricted discussion of proposals via electronic mailing lists is 
possible. A steering body, the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), is 
formed by the IETF Chair and the area directors. IESG coordinates the activities 
of the working groups, assigns group chairs and approves the results of the 
groups work. To be adopted as a standard the draft must be accepted by IETF 
                                                   
12  Not included in Figure 2 is another big consortium, the Object Management Group. 
OMG was founded by eight companies in 1989 to develop software specifications. 
Today the consortium includes over 800 members. 
13  An initial incentive was provided in the USA in 1984. Congress enacted the National 
Cooperative Research Act which relaxed antitrust sanctions against cooperative re-
search and development of otherwise competing firms. This made it easier for pri-
vate companies to jointly develop standards outside the official ANSI-accredited or-
ganizations.  
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and IESG on the basis of consensus. The Internet Architecture Board (IAB), the 
highest committee in the hierarchy of Internet self-governance, only becomes in-
volved in the standardization process if conflicts at the working level cannot be 
resolved. All the work is done by volunteers  as it is in most other standardiza-
tion organizations. 
With many researchers and engineering professionals as active members, IETF is 
comparable to professional associations involved in standardization at the na-
tional or international level such as IEEE. The Institute of Electrical and Electron-
ics Engineers has its core membership in North America but is a transnational so-
ciety with about 300,000 individual members in over 130 countries. IEEE has 
achieved the status of a recognized standardization organization, both in the US 
and in the context of the official international organizations. Like IEEE, most of 
the professional organizations rely on individual and not on organizational mem-
bership. 
With the Internets take-off into a global dimension and its increasing commercial 
viability, the number of individuals involved in standardization has increased 
enormously. The latest IETF meetings were attended by a thousand or more peo-
ple. IAB and IESG reacted to this trend by formalizing their working proce-
dures.14 Some observers regard these changes as an adaptation to the tradi-
tional international standardization organizations (cf. Lehr 1995). For many 
years Internet standards were almost completely ignored by JTC1 and ITU-T. 
Only recently has the Internet been officially recognized, and links of coordina-
tion have been established between IETF and other standards organizations in-
cluding JTC1 (Radack 1994) and ITU-T.15 
The success of the Internet has very much contributed to the changing official 
understanding of open standards because it has demonstrated that the old idea of 
a coherent system of open standards for computer networks according to the 
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) frame of reference has failed. The failure of 
this undertaking, which was supported by many governments in the world, but 
in particular by Europeans including the Commission of the European Union 
(Bucciarelli 1995), has proved that government intervention into coordinative 
                                                   
14  This is indicated, for example, by the length of a memo on the Internet standards 
process these two bodies jointly issued. The document, published in March 1994 
(RFC 1602), is 36 pages long, but this is only one-third the length of a comparable di-
rective of ISO/IEC from 1995 dealing with the procedures of technical work of JTC1 
on information technology. 
15  In September 1998 the Telecommunication Standardization Advisory Group (TSAG) 
of ITU agreed on a set of procedures to allow ITU-T to develop technical specifica-
tions for Internet Protocol (IP) based networks in cooperation with IETF (and the 
Internet Society as representative of IETF). 
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standardization is an extremely sensitive business (cf. Werle 1997).16 The recent 
dissolution of EWOS which focused on the production of OSI standards profiles 
confirms this assessment. 
In the middle of the 1990s, the number of private standardization organizations in 
the computer and related industries was estimated at 200 (Updegrove 1995). A 
recent survey of the Information Society Standardization System (ISSS)17 identi-
fied over 140 consortiums and forums which claim to be open organizations 
(CEN/ISSS 1999). Most of the consortiums and forums are vendor-driven, and 
they are only loosely linked to politics, if at all. Thus, they belong to the category 
of standardization organizations which are regarded as being openly responsive 
to commercial market concerns (National Research Council [US] 1995: 37). Not 
all of these private groups are transformed into stable institutionalized standardi-
zation committees; many disappear once a particular task has been finished. 
Institutional isomorphism and peaceful co-existence 
The landscape of official and private standardization organizations has been 
characterized from different angles. Rutkowski (1995)  with a view of standardi-
zation in the context of the Internet  regards the organizations as being both co-
operative and competitive at the same time (Rutkowski 1995). Cargill (1999: 37) 
has observed a struggle for hegemony between private and official organiza-
tions with some decline in the importance of the latter. However, in his view, the 
majority of corporations accept both as equal partners in standardization 
(Cargill 1999: 41). The CEN/ISSS (1999: 7) survey also comes to the conclusion 
that there has been a relative decline in the role of formal standardization, which 
has been matched by the development of consortium standardization. Other au-
thors stress the stability and efficiency (Genschel 1997), the symbiotic nature 
(David/Shurmer 1996) or even the synergistic quality (Walli 1999) of the rela-
tionship between formal and informal standards organizations.18 
                                                   
16  Indeed: Standards should not be seen as a simple way to implement industrial pol-
icy (Grindley 1995: 225). 
17  The ISSS was created by CEN with the aim of combining the rapid process of infor-
mal specification with the security offered by the formal open consensus of tradi-
tional standardization (Boyd 1999: 44). 
18  This includes a trend to take advantage of the willingness of manufacturers  to 
become more fully integrated in the standards process. Industry driven bodies de-
velop technical specifications, usually in focused areas, that are then passed to formal 
standards bodies for ratification (Grindley/Salant/Waverman 1999: 33, 39, 40). 
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We find very few instances of open conflicts between the official standardization 
organizations and most of the private ones.19 The majority of the private units 
only claim competence in narrow areas of standard setting, some of which are not 
adequately covered by the official organizations. Even IETF has never officially 
expressed imperialistic claims with respect to international standardization al-
though the Internet has developed into the most significant global computer net-
work. IETF has also accepted that standards for the World Wide Web (WWW) are 
developed by the W3 Consortium, which has been established outside IETF with 
the aim of developing, supporting, testing and disseminating the WWW proto-
cols.20 This, however, does not mean that there is no overlap with an inherent po-
tential of conflicts. Given the rapid technological change in information technol-
ogy and telecommunications, it is almost inevitable that different organizations 
decide to develop standards for a new product or service simultaneously. A re-
cent example is provided by Internet telephony. The opportunity to use the Inter-
net as a cheap telephone network or even as a means for real time multimedia 
communication has been discerned by a number of vendors. At the same time 
standardization organizations have started to develop standards for different fea-
tures of such new services. The incomplete list of organizations involved in-
cludes: 
 ITU-T, ETSI (Tiphon), the Voice over IP (VoIP) Forum, the Interoperability 
Now (iNow) Group, the International Multimedia Teleconferencing Consor-
tium (IMTC), IETF (IPTEL working group), the Enterprise Computer Teleph-
ony Forum (ECTF), the Internet Telephony Interoperability Consortium at the 
MIT and, to a minor degree also, the ATM Forum, the ADSL Forum, the Ob-
ject Management Group (OMG), and a technical subcommittee of ECSA-T1. 
All these organizations are not only aware of each others involvement in this 
area; they also report to maintain coordinated liaisons or other links of coordina-
tion and exchange. While some organizations focus on developing standards, 
others see their role in the selection and promotion of standards for specific ap-
plications in this innovative field. This indicates that indeed a symbiotic co-
existence has emerged (cf. David/Shurmer 1996: 804). Although the organiza-
tions coordinate their activities with each other, it appears indispensable to some 
firms such as Vocaltec, Cisco or Lucent to be present in most of them at the same 
time (cf. Just/Latzer 1999: 22). 
                                                   
19  There was some turbulence, however, at the national level in the USA at the end of 
the 1980s (cf. Cargill 1999). 
20  The Consortium is open only to organizational membership. More than 150 member 
organizations contribute to the budget of W3C, out of which the activities of the con-
sortium are financed. 
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If  due to overlapping jurisdictions  conflicts occur, such as those reported by 
the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA 1992: 1214) in the USA involving the 
IEEE Computer Committee, X3 and TC1, they are pacified through formal or in-
formal cooperation agreements.21 In the international realm, informal mecha-
nisms are usually activated at the working level of the standardization organiza-
tions to avoid conflict (Gibson 1995). If a group in one organization learns that 
people in another organization are working on a similar problem, they try to con-
cert the activities without involving the top executives of their organizations. 
More often than not, this is facilitated by personal networks cross-cutting organ-
izational boundaries or by individuals who are members of several standardiza-
tion organizations (overlapping membership). 
However, formal committees have also been set up to avoid conflict and coordi-
nate standardization activities. The already mentioned Europe-based Information 
and Communications Technologies Standards Board (ICTSB) provides an exam-
ple. Initiated by the three official European standards organizations, ETSI, CEN 
and CENELEC, it coordinates the work of these with other member organizations 
such as the ATM Forum, ECMA, The Open Group and many other consortiums 
and forums in this area. The European Commission and the EFTA Secretariat are 
affiliated as observers. 
Also, many bilateral or multilateral agreements between private consortiums and 
official standardization organizations indicate a preference for cooperation on 
both sides. The agreements range from formal liaisons and memorandums of co-
operation to occasional issue-specific links initiated by individual members of the 
organizations. The CEN/ISSS (1999) survey gives an impression of the frequency 
of links of private consortiums and forums to other standardization organizations 
 private as well as official ones. Figure 4, based on data of this report, provides 
an overview of the frequency with which (selected) official standardization or-
ganizations are mentioned as partners of the private consortiums and forums. If 
we add to this picture all the links among these private organizations, we arrive 
at a hugely complex web of official and unofficial organizations which has upset 
the traditional hierarchy of standardization organizations. One result of this de-
velopment is that the organizations use an increasing part of their manpower to 
coordinate with others.22 
                                                   
21  OTA explicitly pleads for cooperation rather than conflict (OTA 1992: 1214). 
22  CEN/ISSS stresses the need for cooperation on its homepage: ICT standardization/
specification activities have to be collaborative. With the convergence in technologies 
between telecommunications, IT and broadcasting, we must all recognize that there 
are likely to be common interests between different organizations. Furthermore, the 
sheer number of different organizations, whether in Europe or elsewhere, active in 
ICT specification, makes co-ordination an absolute imperative in the interests of the 
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The overview of the landscape of standardization organizations and their rela-
tionships suggests that, with the evolution of many private standardization units, 
the potential of jurisdictional conflicts has increased. However, the level of con-
flicts has remained low, which has led some observers to the conclusion that the 
development does not call for a re-structuring of the national and international 
standards system (Rankine 1995: 566). For others, it comes as a surprise that only 
few open conflicts occurred between standardization organizations. 
If we look at standardization organizations from the angle of collective action and 
organization theory, they appear to be what Coleman calls corporate actors 
(Coleman 1974; 1990). Members of the organizations transfer resources to the 
corporate actor to reach their common goals efficiently. Corporate actors develop 
an interest not only in autonomy and organizational survival, but also growth 
and domain expansion. This interest prevails in large corporations as well as in 
smaller organizations and it is not identical with an interest in profit maximiza-
tion. Therefore, we can expect standardization organizations to struggle for pre-
dominance in their area of responsibility. However, due to institutional features, 
including the non-profit orientation which most organizations in the standardiza-
tion field have in common, the corporate actors  even if they have hundreds of 
members  are comparatively weak. The resources directly available to the or-
                                                                                                                                                  
effective use of industrys scarce resources (http://www.cenorm.be/isss/ 
partnerships.htm). 
Figure 4 Number of forums and consortiums reporting links  
to official standardization organizations 
Official Organizations 
ANSIa  20 
ECMAb  5 
CENb  10 
CENELECb  6 
ETSIb  22 
IECc  13 
ISOc  18 
ITUc  21 
JTC 1c  8 
N=135  
a National (USA) 
b European 
c International 
Source: CEN/ISSS (1999) 
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ganizations are small. They rely on volunteers and have to grant them autonomy 
in the process of standard setting. Members expect their fees to be used to pro-
vide resources for the work of task forces and for the dissemination and imple-
mentation of standards, rather than for organizational politics and domain ex-
pansion. As a consequence, many standardization organizations only have a 
small team of full time employees running the organization. They appear as ac-
tion arenas rather than powerful corporate actors. The majority of consortiums 
and forums have limited scale and scope, while the official standardization or-
ganizations likewise cannot adequately cover all areas of standard setting. There-
fore, any threat on the part of a single organization to invade other organizations 
territories should be seen as only so much rhetoric. 
Not only organizational weakness and scarce resources, but also positive institu-
tional commitments on the part of standardization organizations trigger peaceful 
co-existence rather than competition. The most prominent institutional features 
the majority of standardization organizations have in common are included in 
Figure 3 above. The principal of parsimony of standards has already been em-
phasized. The organizations common interest in converging on one single stan-
dard is linked to the phenomenon of critical mass and positive externalities of 
network technologies. New private consortiums and forums share this principle 
with the incumbent ones.23 Also with respect to other features, many new or-
ganizations appear to be designed according to the model of existing ones. Simi-
larly, if we look at the bylaws and charters of many consortiums and forums, as 
well as at the internal organization of work, we come across what is called mi-
metic isomorphism, as defined by DiMaggio and Powell (1991), referring to proc-
esses of imitation and copying of organizational models. Standardization organi-
zations do not duplicate the strategies and structures of business firms, but of 
other standardization organizations. 
This includes the consensus principle, which, however, in combination with the 
principle of the openness of organizations to all interested parties, has proved to 
be most critical with respect to a smooth process of standard setting.24 As men-
tioned earlier, it is difficult to reach consensus on a standard if all interested par-
                                                   
23  So does the World Trade Organization, which emphasizes the benefits of having not 
more than one international standard in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (cf. Falke 1999). 
24  The consensus principle has one root in the engineering profession, whose normative 
basis includes a strong orientation towards consensus coupled with the general belief 
that most problems have one optimal technical solution which can be approached 
through a technical discourse (cf. Schmidt/Werle 1993; 1998). The normative influ-
ence of the engineering profession on standardization, which has remained a techni-
cal business, tends to be underestimated. Di Maggio/Powell (1991) call this mecha-
nism normative isomorphism. 
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ties can easily get access to an organization. Official standardization organiza-
tions are often charged with being too slow, also because they may be too open. 
Less open, i.e. more exclusive, new consortiums and forums may step in to de-
velop and approve standards more quickly. Incumbent organizations may regard 
this as a competitive move, but usually have only limited capacity to speed up 
their standardization work. Therefore they accuse new consortiums and forums 
of not being open and thereby assert an institutionalized value to which new or-
ganizations have to adapt. The pressure on these organizations to be sufficiently 
open is often reinforced by governments who conclude that exclusiveness stifles 
market competition. To a certain degree, standards organizations have to be open 
to new members if they do not want to be perceived as an anti-competitive closed 
shop.25 Thus, there is also a mechanism of coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio/Pow-
ell 1991) at work, which brings about institutional similarity and coordination 
rather than competition between standardization organizations. 
Although the organizational landscape of standardization has changed consid-
erably, competition has not increased accordingly. The institutionalized values of 
the organizational field of standardization change rather slowly. Their dominant 
effect is one of de-legitimizing and reducing competition and jurisdictional con-
flict between organizations which, at the same time, only have limited resources 
to devote to competitive strategies. 
As has been shown above, the typical conflict in compatibility standardization 
has a battle-of-the-sexes structure  within standards organizations as well as be-
tween two separate organizations if they work on the same standard, i.e. a 
functionally equivalent technical specification. In this type of conflict, in which 
the actors share the aversion to ending up without a standard, it is likely that they 
will try and coordinate their work. This can be achieved through some kind of 
division of labor, as in the example of Internet telephony, or by combining forces, 
as in the case of message handling, or simply by granting the right to conclude 
the development of a standard to those who first started working on it. These and 
other mechanisms embedded in the prevailing set of institutional norms have 
proved beneficial to international compatibility standardization in developing 
into a complex and hybrid self-coordinated coordinative regime (Stein 1982), 
where competition is avoided, if possible, and at the same time not too much col-
laboration is needed because this would prove difficult to manage. The dominant 
pattern of the organizational field is peaceful co-existence. 
                                                   
25  Often firms struggle to get access to a consortium because they want to prevent new 
technologies from falling under the proprietary control of sole vendors. 
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4 The choice of standardization organizations 
The analysis of the changing landscape of standardization organizations has 
shown that coordination and co-existence rather than competition between or-
ganizations is the prevailing structural pattern. This appears to be inconsistent 
with reports on spectacular standards battles which trigger the impression that 
hostility, antagonism and mistrust are the rules of the game. We already referred 
to a few instances (OTA 1992; David/Shurmer 1996). One of the most spectacular 
cases of a standards conflict which ended in a complete deadlock and standard 
setting failure was provided by Interactive Videotex  an effort to adopt a com-
mon standard for systems such as the French Teletel/Minitel, the English Prestel, 
the German Bildschirmtext and North American (Telidon, Prodigy etc.) and Japa-
nese (Captain) systems (Schmidt/Werle 1998: 147184). It would be easy to pre-
sent further examples, including the ongoing standards wars related to the 
Third Generation Wireless Telecommunications Standards (Grindley/Salant/
Waverman 1999). Many participants in committee processes of standardization 
recall such conflicts. However, most of these conflicts occurred within standards 
committees during the process of negotiations on standards. They can be ex-
plained through reference to institutional and procedural features of the stan-
dards organizations, on the one hand, and actor and interest constellations in the 
negotiation process, on the other hand (Schmidt/Werle 1998, also Werle 1998).26 
Conflicts between standards organizations over their claims of competence or their 
involvement in overlapping areas of standardization have been rare. They have 
usually been settled by formal agreements or by informal coordination based on 
overlapping membership or informal networks. However, these settlements do 
not determine any division labor which rules out jurisdictional overlap. For a 
company interested in the development of a standard, this overlap provides a 
choice as to which organization it can turn to in order to initiate standardization. 
On the other hand, what is going on in many standards bodies requires monitor-
ing if a company does not want to risk being leapfrogged by competitors in one 
organization or another. 
                                                   
26  The actors interests can be personal and idiosyncratic or representative of the or-
ganization which has delegated the individual to a standards committee. A small 
survey of individuals in subcommittees of the US standards committee X3 (informa-
tion technology) revealed strikingly personal motivations for participation (Spring 
et al. 1995: 228). Asked to pick a statement that best described their motivation in 
participating in and contributing to the standards process, two thirds of the respon-
dents stated prestige, curiosity or a desire to positively influence future events. Only 
one fourth stressed employer benefits (ibid.). 
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Although at times vendors have tried to impose standards on the markets for 
telecommunications and information technology, no single firm has managed to 
keep control over the technical specifications in large segments of this innovative 
market for a long period of time (cf. Gabel 1991; Grindley 1995). Despite the 
transferability of basic hardware and software components, even large corpora-
tions such as IBM, Microsoft or AT&T normally do not have the competence to 
produce complete systems for data processing and telecommunications. Firms 
that usually compete feel compelled to collaborate or at least coordinate the de-
velopment and design of technology. 
There is a growing tendency to design and treat single technical artifacts as parts 
of larger technical systems. Innovation and enlargement are less the application 
of separate inventions than the integration of different new products and proc-
esses into new systems (Van Tulder/Junne 1988: 219). Technological leadership 
does not enable any firm to design and assemble a (large) technical system inde-
pendently from others, although each firm may try supplying as many compo-
nents as possible and bundle or package them into a systemic product (Teece 
1988; Matutes/Regibeau 1992; Robertson/Langlois 1992). Many technical de-
vices are manufactured by specialists who regard their products as components of 
more encompassing technical systems (Tassey 1992: 169202). Interdependencies 
and complementarities of large systems imply a growing need for coordination 
on the production, operation and use of technical components. This has stimu-
lated and accelerated the work of standards committees with the result that more 
and more standards  as a means of coordination  have been adopted by official 
standardization organizations and by private consortiums and forums. They in-
clude basic standards, as well as specific functional standards and standard pro-
files. 
Thus, business firms including technology leaders recognize a need to coordinate 
with others, and they often opt for collectively developing compatibility stan-
dards to achieve coordination. From interviews with employees of firms involved 
in standardization, we have learned that membership in standardization organi-
zations is seen as a normal and often necessary element of business activity 
(Schmidt/Werle 1998: 8598). Firms act with decreasing intensity at the national 
level and increasing intensity at the regional and the international level, both in 
official and in informal organizations, and they often consider it necessary to be 
present in standardization in telecommunications as well as information technol-
ogy. About 30 generalist firms participate in virtually all major consortiums, fo-
rums and official standardization organizations. Large companies have reported 
participation in not far short of 100 separate standards bodies of all kinds (see 
ISSS 1999 at http:/ /www.cenorm.be/isss/partnerships.htm). 
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This does not mean that in each case these companies, and those which are mem-
bers of only a few standards organizations, intend to actively contribute to the 
development of a standard. Frequently, as mentioned, they only monitor stan-
dardization processes to screen technical innovations and to intervene if potential 
competitors are about to agree on a hostile standard which threatens the firms 
market position. IBM, for example, as one of the big players, already participated 
in message handling (e-mail) standardization in CCITT, a forerunner of ITU-T, in 
the early 1980s, although at the time the corporation was not heavily interested in 
supporting open standards in this area, where it relied on proprietary solutions. 
Companies options and the limits of organized standardization 
Generally, a company has different options concerning standard setting, some of 
which I will illustrate here. One option is trying to bypass organized standardiza-
tion and set a de facto standard in the market. Many standards in telecommunica-
tions and even more in information technology can be regarded as market stan-
dards. They have been imposed by market leaders or have evolved in uncon-
trolled market processes. A second option is participating in the work of an offi-
cial or a private standards organization if the company gains access to the organi-
zation. If the work on a standard has already been initiated by a company, other 
interested companies usually have no choice but to join the standards committee 
that has started developing the standard. In specific cases, companies may decide 
to initiate parallel standardization in another organization. A third option is set-
ting up a new consortium or forum which deals with the standards project. 
The attractiveness of the different options primarily depends on three groups of 
variables. The first group includes company features such as the market position, 
the capability to develop advanced technology and the general business strategy. 
The second group is related to the nature of the technology and the relative sig-
nificance of a specific standard in the architecture of a technical system. The third 
group includes characteristics of standardization organizations such as those dis-
cussed above. The relevance of this last group, the institutional features, is what I 
will focus on after a brief look at the role of a standards significance in the choice 
of a standards organization. 
It has been stressed in the theoretical introduction that compatibility standardiza-
tion in general is an undertaking in which companies that usually compete now 
collaborate. However, the tension between collaboration and competition remains 
an inherent strain on compatibility standardization. If the conflicts take the form 
of a battle of the sexes with moderate relative gains, the organizations rules of 
negotiation designed to transform the battle into a pure coordination game pro-
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vide opportunities for compromise. The size of the relative gains is often linked to 
the relative significance of a standard. Many technical systems are asymmetric in 
the sense that a technical periphery is grouped around a few core components. 
The standards of these core components largely determine the shape of the sys-
tems (Henderson/Clark 1990; Anderson/Tushman 1990). As a result, relative 
gains tend to be high when standards of core components are involved. If manu-
facturers of functionally equivalent core components prefer different standards, 
the conflict will be similar to zero sum (the case of substitutive compatibility). 
Such a standards conflict compares with a conflict of two companies which sell 
complete systems and therefore do not rely on compatibility with the competi-
tors technology. Many spectacular standards conflicts are indeed what has been 
called battles of the systems (Hughes 1983; David/Bunn 1988; Schmidt/Werle 
1998). In such conflicts as the struggle for a standard for Color TV (1960s), Interac-
tive Videotex (early 1980s) or High Definition Television (HDTV  1980s), it is 
highly unlikely that a compromise can be reached in any of the existing official or 
private standards organizations as long as they are open to all competitors. If one 
company initiates standardization in one organization, the competitors will also 
enter the organization and block the standards process. Conversely, if companies 
are highly committed to the same system, it is likely that they will reach an 
agreement on a standard notwithstanding the organization to which the issue is 
taken. The Internet Community provides such an example of individuals and 
organizations committed to what can be called a dominant design, in this case the 
TCP/IP protocol stack. For a long time the Internet Engineering Task Force had 
only few problems achieving consensus on a standard, and we can assume that 
the same people would have agreed on the same standards in another standardi-
zation organization, too. 
Market acceptance of standards and costs of their production 
The vast majority of standardization activities focus on components rather than 
systems standards. In many of these cases, specific features of the standardization 
organizations are considered by companies when they have an option to choose 
where they are going to put the standards issue on the agenda. One criterion 
which guides the decision concerns the implementation or market acceptance of a 
standard. This problem is, of course, inevitably related to all non-market proc-
esses of standardization. An example how organizational features are assessed 
when implementation is expected to be a crucial issue is provided by message 
handling standardization (see Schmidt/Werle 1998: 229262). Preparatory work 
started in the late 1970s, in the International Federation for Information Process-
ing (IFIP), a federation of national technical and professional societies dealing 
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with information processing. Although it is not a standardization organization, 
IFIP has always conducted pre-standardization work directed towards providing 
input into the formal standardization processes of other organizations. In the late 
1970s, IFIPs Technical Committee 6 (data communication) discussed technical 
design issues in the field of electronic mail and message handling systems. The 
organization was particularly suited for this kind of initial work on a new project 
because it relied on a broad membership. From the outset, there was a consensus 
that a completely new system was needed which should complement and subse-
quently replace proprietary systems. 
Given this consensus, the question remained as to where to turn to initiate official 
standardization. Both the International Standardization Organization (ISO) and 
CCITT, a forerunner of the International Telecommunication Unions standardi-
zation branch (ITU-T), were regarded suitable to provide an appropriate arena. 
Preferences, however, were split, although the most influential participants opted 
for CCITT. In particular, people from Canadas Bell Northern Research Corpora-
tion (BNR) were in favor of the top telecommunications standards organiza-
tion.27 This has to be seen against the telecommunications background of BNR 
and the traditional affiliation to CCITT, although BNRs conviction that global 
implementation of message handling standards would virtually be guaranteed by 
a CCITT endorsement also played an important role. In the early 1980s, most 
public network operators enjoyed a national monopoly. They regarded CCITT as 
their international standardization organization even though other companies 
were not formally excluded from membership anymore. Usually the network op-
erators were committed to implementing CCITT standards in their networks. 
In the eyes of those who had reservations about opting for CCITT, this advantage 
was compensated for by the fact that cooperation in an organization which was 
dominated by the operators of public networks would in effect stabilize their mo-
nopolies. In addition, these companies  computer and software vendors , which 
were more familiar with computer messaging than the network operators, feared 
becoming involved in useless controversies in CCITT, with monopolies lagging 
behind the front line of innovative technology and products. In their view an in-
appropriate outdated standard might be developed in CCITT which would be 
implemented by the network operators but not be accepted by the users. There-
fore, several computer companies turned to ISO, where public network operators 
were not represented or played a minor role. This shows that the standards or-
ganizations membership structure and its relevance concerning the implementa-
tion and user acceptance of a standard guided the companies choices. 
                                                   
27  At the time, BNR was a joint R&D organization belonging to Bell Canada (30%) and 
Northern Telecom (70%), with a strong focus on telecommunications networks tech-
nology for both public and private networks. 
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The ensuing work on message handling standards in CCITT and ISO had differ-
ent results. Work progressed continuously in CCITT, and a series of standards 
(the X.400 series) was adopted in 1984. However, although network operators 
gradually implemented the standard, X.400 message handling did not take off, 
partly because the standard was indeed not user-friendly. Within ISO, work fo-
cused on a standards system called MOTIS (Message-Oriented Text Interchange 
Systems). However, not much progress was made because those computer ven-
dors who already had proprietary messaging systems slowed down the speed of 
work. Meanwhile, the activities in CCITT and ISO gave rise to a jurisdictional 
conflict between these organizations, to which I have already referred. This con-
flict was resolved by those activists in both organizations doing the standardiza-
tion work and sharing the commitment to one open standard which had evolved 
in the days of common IFIP sessions. Diverging views between manufacturers 
and operators in the telecommunications domain, on the one hand, and computer 
vendors, on the other, concerning the domain name system in particular delayed 
the work several times. But most of it consolidated under the roof of ITU, and vir-
tually identical standards were adopted by CCITT and ISO. 
To complete the story: Around 1984 standardization was reinforced when the 
European Computer Manufacturers Association (ECMA) started work on mes-
sage handling standards as a kind of by-product in the context of office commu-
nication and document exchange procedures (MIDA  Message Interchange 
Document Architecture). For the participants in ECMA, it was a matter of routine, 
rather than an explicit strategic move, to deal with standardization in this area. 
Jurisdictional conflict with CCITT was avoided because at the working level 
ECMAs activities could be influenced by and partly aligned with those of CCITT 
due to overlapping membership of specialists from Xerox and Siemens. As a uni-
fied international standard for message handling was in the interest of both firms, 
they carried out the necessary work to adapt MIDA to X.400. 
Once adopted, standards reduce transaction costs. At first, however, their devel-
opment induces such costs. The expenses incurred by the companies multiply if 
they must delegate experts to different organizations working on the same stan-
dard. This occurred in message handling, and it led to a consolidation of work in 
one organization. Similarly, transaction costs increase because standardization at 
the international or regional level is often coupled with concomitant activities at 
the national level. Global players striving for an international standard benefit 
from the support at the national level. However, this makes it vital to also get in-
volved at this level in order to ensure that the preferred standard is developed at 
home.28 At times, national measures of coordination are more contentious than 
                                                   
28  Multinationals often try to gain influence on the standardization process in several 
countries (Cargill 1999). 
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the international negotiation process. This could be observed in the USA in the 
early years of message handling standardization. In the early 1980s, the National 
Bureau of Standards (NBS, later NIST), an agency of the US Department of Com-
merce, started work on message handling standardization. NBS prepared a stan-
dard which it intended to feed into the CCITT process. The conflict arose from 
work done for NBS by BBN  a company which had been much involved in the 
ARPANET work on the basis of government contracts. The results of BBNs work 
(related to message formats and encoding) were already approved by the NBS 
when Xerox announced opposition because they ran counter to the work done by 
Xerox in the CCITT context. The difference between both proposals need not be 
substantiated. However, within the US context, these different proposals led to a 
memorable confrontation. As Xerox received much stronger backing than NBS 
from the other members of the national delegation including the Electronic Mail 
Association, NBS eventually withdrew its proposal. Thanks to its activity at both 
the national and the international level, Xerox managed to stabilize its position in 
CCITT and receive approval for its standard proposal.29 The resource-consuming 
requirement of simultaneous involvement in standardization at the national and 
the supranational level was an important reason for multinationals in Europe to 
support the establishment of ETSI as the central official European standardization 
organization in telecommunications and by this prevent the establishment of 
many national bodies after liberalization of this industry. 
Speed and exclusiveness of standardization 
Thus far we have seen that considerations concerning the market acceptance of a 
committee standard and transaction costs incurred in the process of standards 
development guide the choice of standardization organizations. Standards 
adopted on the basis of consensus in official standards organizations with a broad 
membership are very likely to diffuse in the market. Seen from this angle, the of-
ficial organizations appear attractive to companies. At the same time, in order to 
minimize transaction costs, companies prefer that work on a standard is concen-
trated in one organization. Thus, companies should choose a supranational offi-
                                                   
29  It is ironic that, after all the struggles on message handling and e-mail, not X.400, but 
a standard developed by IETF (SMTP  simple mail transport protocol), i.e. from out-
side the official standardization organizations, turned out to be the one which is most 
widely used. For many years, neither ITU-T nor ISO/JTC1 reacted officially to the 
growing popularity of e-mail communication in the Internet based on SMTP. In view 
of the potential competitor, however, both organizations made efforts to streamline 
X.400 and to add some functionality (see Schmidt/Werle 1998). This, however, did 
not help X.400, which apart from its technical complexity suffered from the delays in 
the early process of development. 
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cial standardization organization if they become involved in the development of 
a standard. 
However, standardization in official organizations often proceeds slowly. In these 
organizations political, business and technical interests are blended. At the same 
time, the organizations rely on a broad membership. Where different dimensions 
of merit guide the evaluation of standards and many experts with diverging in-
terests are involved, it is difficult to achieve consensus  at least it takes consider-
able time. Moreover, companies cannot be sure of being able to control the proc-
ess. Those with a high interest in a standard, therefore, prefer to standardize 
faster and better in a private consortium or forum (Cargill 1999: 38). And, with 
network technologies, faster often means better. More exclusive private consorti-
ums and forums are often as international in scope as the official standardization 
organizations. With a membership at least initially restricted to technology lead-
ers and firms with substantial market power, they have the potential to be more 
efficient and more effective than the official organizations. 
Setting up new standards organizations, however, also involves transaction costs. 
Consortiums and forums are based on multilateral contracts including member-
ship and decision rules, cost-sharing principles, and other statutes and bylaws. 
Transaction costs can be reduced if a new consortium is established after the 
model of existing ones  another source of institutional isomorphism. It may also 
be attractive to use a consortium, once established, for new standardization pro-
jects after the initial project has been concluded. 
It is difficult to trace in every single case the reasons companies have for setting 
up a forum or consortium. To some observers, the companies standardization 
strategies including the creation of new organizations appear to be erratic and 
unstable (Krieb 1999: 95). But this may simply be a correlate of the struggle for 
standards in cases where the stakes are extremely high because core components 
of a technical system are involved. In these cases, companies try to exclude rivals 
and include allies through setting up new consortiums and forums. But they have 
to be aware that formal exclusion of rivals is not sustainable, because this violates 
anti-trust rules. Opening up standardization for rivals to participate in, on the 
other hand, makes it unattractive to continue the work because a consensus is 
unlikely to be reached unless a competitive advantage is sacrificed. As a result, 
companies may choose to submit their standards plans to another standardiza-
tion organization where the rivals are not present yet. This phenomenon can be 
called committee-hopping. 
An early example of committee-hopping has been provided by Sirbu and 
Hughes. It draws on standardization of local area networks (Sirbu/Hughes 
1986). The process began in a subcommittee of IEC (PROWAY) in 1975, but failed 
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to make any progress in subsequent years. Approached by several semiconductor 
merchants, IEEEs Committee 802 stepped in and began standardization in 1980. 
Three subcommittees started work involving many experts. The apparent initial 
progress being made at IEEE convinced the chairman of PROWAY to redirect ef-
forts and switch from IEC to IEEE. In the past, IEEE had usually succeeded in 
achieving consensus on one single standard. All relevant US and, subsequently, 
European computer manufacturers, chip producers and retailers, as well as aca-
demics, government officials and several users, participated in the enterprise. But 
in this case with so many divergent interests and high stakes involved IEEE also 
ran into difficulties. The main proponents of the standardization project  DEC, 
Intel, and Xerox  therefore decided to initiate a parallel procedure in the more 
exclusive ECMA. There a draft standard for local area networks (ethernet)  very 
much in line with the main sponsors preferences  was adopted in June 1982. 
This agreement could only be achieved because in the context of ECMA  unlike 
the open marketplace of the inclusive IEEE  it was possible to compromise 
with Ethernets main opponent IBM, who was also active in ECMA. The propo-
nents had to accept IBMs standard (token ring) as well. After this solution was 
reached, the standards were fed back into the IEEE process and were also ap-
proved there. But this was only a formal act, as was a later adoption of these 
standards by ISO. 
Another more recent example is related to the standardization of Java from Sun. 
This company, traditionally committed to open standards, originally submitted 
Java specifications to ISO/JTC1 to become an open standard. After a short time 
Sun became concerned with losing control over the process. Java in different vari-
ants appeared attractive for consumer electronics manufacturers and operators 
such as Sony or Philips, who generally backed Sun (cf. Krieb 1999; Cargill 1999). 
As Javas design provides an encompassing alternative of a networked system, 
hostile to the PC-centric model of Microsoft and its PC-focused allies, it was 
taken on by this group. Sun, therefore, switched standards efforts to ECMA and  
assisted by the Open Group and the Object Management Group  submitted a 
proposal for a JavaScript standard which was adopted as ECMAScript. However, 
this standard, which was fed into the JTC1 process and quickly adopted there, 
has no central significance with respect to the battle of the systems mentioned 
above. Parts of this battle may take place within the confines of ECMA because 
not only Sun, but also Microsoft, is a member of this organization. The exclusive-
ness ECMA provided in the past in regard to the absence of Microsoft has been 
lost since this company  realizing that its enemy UNIX was pushed by others 
within ECMA  became a member in the second half of the 1990s. Again, no stan-
dards organization, official or private, will be able to facilitate a compromise in 
the battle of the systems between Sun and Microsoft as the leading contenders on 
either side. 
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No choice for small and medium-sized enterprises? 
Committee-hopping  in the foregoing examples from large inclusive and hetero-
geneous organizations to smaller, more homogeneous and exclusive ones  re-
quires resources and often full-time standardization experts. Other standardiza-
tion strategies which include different arenas at different levels are also only 
available to large companies. Examples from many countries show that other 
firms cannot afford to get involved in standardization in many organizations at 
the same time. Small and medium-sized enterprises often rely on the official na-
tional standardization organizations and only participate in private consortiums 
and forums if they have a national or a regional focus. In Europe, the opportunity 
for small and medium-sized enterprises to participate in standardization became 
an issue in the early 1990s after the European Commission had published a Green 
Paper (COM(90)456) on the reorganization of standardization aimed at accelerat-
ing the process of economic integration and at increasing the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of the European system of standard setting (cf. Voelzkow 1996). Some 
national standards organizations, such as the Deutsches Institut für Normung 
(DIN), regarded this plan as a maneuver of the Commission aimed at increasing 
the influence of European standards organizations at the expense of the national 
ones. Arguing that small and medium-sized enterprises would only turn to na-
tional, and not to supranational, organizations in standardization matters, DIN 
and its allies managed to stop the European plans. 
Yet DIN and the other national standards organizations in Europe could not stop 
the process of erosion of purely national standardization which can also be ob-
served in the USA. In Europe, the problem of under-representation of small and 
medium-sized companies at the European level, and even more so at the interna-
tional level, of standardization has turned into a political issue, as has the absence 
of users in many standardization processes.30 For the time being no institutional 
recipe, apart from government assistance and subsidies, seems to be available to 
increase participation of these groups in official as well as private standards or-
ganizations at the regional and international levels. 
                                                   
30  For a broad discussion of the potential role and institutional integration of users in 
standardization, see Foray (1992; 1994). 
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5 Conclusion 
The global landscape of standardization organizations is shaped by political, pro-
fessional and business interests. Elements of these three aspects are present in all 
standardization organizations. In the last decade in which an increasing prolifera-
tion of standards organizations could be observed, business interests prevailed. 
Strategic business concerns were driving forces towards setting up new consorti-
ums and forums which were meant to bypass or complement the incumbent offi-
cial standardization organizations. The result, however, was not fierce jurisdic-
tional competition, but rather increasing efforts to coordinate between these or-
ganizations in particular where jurisdictions overlap. Institutional mechanisms 
and values guided this development. Their rationale lies in the need for and posi-
tive economic effects of compatibility in network technologies such as telecom-
munications and information technology. 
To companies and other actors the proliferation of standardization organizations 
whose domains partly overlap provides a choice. Companies can choose to which 
organizations they turn if they want to submit a standards proposal. Most stan-
dards organizations are quite open to new members. Formal membership rules 
do not erect insurmountable barriers to entry. Certain standards organizations 
will look attractive or appropriate, depending on the specific standardization is-
sue (and related concerns such as speed and cost of standard setting), the market 
acceptance of the standard to be developed, and the conflicts connected with the 
development. If companies expect that broad consensus will be difficult to 
achieve they will prefer to take the issue to a more exclusive arena with a small 
circle of participants, often one of the new specialized private consortiums and 
forums. If the diffusion and implementation of a standard is regarded as the cen-
tral problem, firms prefer submitting a proposal to one of the official organiza-
tions. They are officially recognized by governments, and their products enjoy 
high legitimacy. As problems  often unexpectedly  change during a standardi-
zation process, companies consider switching from one organization to another 
or proceed simultaneously in different organizations  an option which is only 
available to large companies. Many small and medium-sized enterprises are more 
constrained  primarily as a consequence of limited resources. To them, only par-
ticipation in official and private organizations with a focus on national or regional 
markets is affordable. 
No standards organization combines all the merits which are required for the 
smooth development and successful market diffusion of standards. The land-
scape of organizations, however, which has developed into an organizational 
network with partly institutionalized links of coordination, offers many useful 
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complementarities, the most visible being the tendency of consortiums and fo-
rums to feed their standards into the adoption process of the official organiza-
tions where they are approved without intensive further negotiations. Spectacu-
lar standards wars of the battle-of-the-systems type, however, cannot be pacified 
by todays standards organizations. Their resolution is left to the market. 
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